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ABSTRACT  
This work presents a consideration of the applicability of risky decision-making theory models as a tool to 
XQGHUVWDQGGULYHUV¶WDNH-over behaviour from vehicle automation, while also incorporating WKH³2XWRIWKH
/RRS´FRQFHSWDQGWKHSURFHVVRI6LWXDWLRQ$ZDUHQHVV5HFRYHU\$PHWKRGRORJLFDOGLVFXVVLRQLVprovided, 
and implications for the processes involved in system design developments are presented. Finally, the paper 
concludes that the process of evidence accumulation in risky decision-making theory models has strong 
parallels with the process of Situation Awareness recovery. We argue that evidence accumulation models 
can be used as a tool to understand what information is used by drivers for achieving safe transitions of 
control from automation so that this knowledge can be used for a better, and more human-centred design 
of future in-vehicle interfaces. 
 
Keywords: Decision-making, Transition of control, Interface Design, Driver Behaviour, Behavioural 
Modelling, Automated Vehicles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the human factors-related challenges of implementing vehicle automation, is 
ensuring safe responses from users during transitions of control. Recent research into this issue 
forms part of a larger body of research regarding the better design of human-machine interfaces, 
spanning multiple domains and decades. These challenges highlight an old irony of automation, 
where the more reliable the automation, the less prepared the human is to react in a time of 
need (Bainbridge, 1985). This is especially true for higher levels of vehicle automation, which do 
not require continuous monitoring of the driving task, but still rely on users to resume control, for 
example, when a system limitation is reached (Level 3. See SAE, 2018 for a complete 
description of the levels of vehicular automation). 
Many recent driving simulator studies, for example, those described by Louw & Merat 
(2017), have identified that drivers in higher levels of vehicle automation (SAE L2+), are 
removed from the decision-making and control loops of the driving taskSODFLQJWKHP³RXWRIWKH
ORRS´ (see Merat et al. (2018) for a recent description of the term). This disengagement from the 
loops is thought to reduce GULYHUV¶capacity to react in dangerous situations, increasing the 
likelihood of collisions.  
Many researchers have tried to understand what constitutes a safe transition of control 
from automation, investigating what factors influence the success of a transition. For example, 
Gold et al. (2013) demonstrated that drivers¶ response to an impending collision, following a 
request for a transition of control, is dependent on the amount of time given to drivers for this 
response. These authors report that when drivers were given less time to react, they reacted 
faster, but more erratically, DVVKRZQE\WKHYHKLFOH¶Vlateral and longitudinal accelerations. In 
contrast, when given more time to respond to an impending collision, drivers reacted more 
slowly but had a more stable response profile.  
Zeeb at al. (2015, 2016) have VKRZQWKDWGULYHUV¶WDNH-over time and the quality of this 
take over (measured as vehicle lateral deviation), is linked to their attention to the road 
environment during automated driving, with higher levels of distraction to other, non-driving-
related tasks, leading to a deterioration of take-over quality. However, Louw et al. (2018) 
suggest that take-over time and vehicle controllability alone are not good predictors of a safe 
transition of control, but rather the early mitigation of a threat, with earlier transitions of control 
leading to fewer collisions. 
A common limitation of studies attempting to correlate dULYHUV¶visual attention with their 
performance on non-driving-related tasks during automation, is that most investigate the location 
RIGULYHUV¶JD]HUDWKHUWKDQattempting to understand how visual information, acquired from 
different sources during automation engagement, DIIHFWVGULYHUV¶UHVXPSWLRQRIFRQWURO. While 
WKHUHKDYHEHHQHIIRUWVWRPRGHOWKHIDFWRUVWKDWLQIOXHQFHGULYHUV¶FDSDELOLWLHVWRWDNH-over 
control, and how they use the physical and mental resources they need to perform such an 
action, most have not managed to generate a predictive model, based on gaze patterns during 
take-overs (Happee et al., 2018). For example, in Victor et al. (2018), while have reported that 
some drivers, even though looking to the road centre, still failed to avoid crashes during a 
transition of control (similar to results also reported by Louw et al., 2017).  
Studies in other domains have considered how visual information sampling affects 
decision making in humans (see Orquin & Loose, 2013 for a complete literature review of these 
studies). For instance, Fiedler & Glöckner (2012), identified that gamblers shift their gaze 
towards the gamble they are willing to make, before their decision, and used this information as 
a predictor of their choice selection.  
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This paper proposes that the application of decision making theories, and related 
models, can be used to address some of the gaps in research on user resumption of control 
from vehicle automation, by providing a quantifiable method of linking the acquisition of specific 
information from the environment to the probability of a particular response (Orquin & Loose, 
2013). Currently, there are only a few studies that highlight the possibility of such a link (c.f. 
Markkula et al., 2018). In this work, we consider how theoretical models for risky decision-
making can be used to study GULYHUV¶transition of control in automation by observing their visual 
sampling behaviour during different stages of the take over process.  
We begin with outlining the two theoretical bases of this work: decision-making theory, 
and the human factors of transitions of control. Thereafter, the two theories will be compared, 
especially regarding their analogous processes of Situation Awareness acquisition and evidence 
accumulation. Finally, this paper considers how such an approach can generate outputs that 
may be applied by system designers, to enhance driver performance and create safer systems. 
2. TRANSITIONS OF CONTROL FROM VEHICLE AUTOMATION  
This section of the paper aims to define key concepts in the field of human factors of 
transitions of control, such as the decision-action loop, Situation Awareness, and the issues that 
are related to this process. With a clear definition of this concept in hand, it will be possible to 
compare them to the concepts related to the decision-making theory, understanding how they 
might interact and complement each other. 
TKHWHUPWUDQVLWLRQRIFRQWUROZDVGHVFULEHGE\/RXZDV³WKHSURFHVVDQGSHULRG
of transferring responsibility of, and control over, some or all aspects of a driving task, between a 
KXPDQGULYHUDQGDQDXWRPDWHGGULYLQJV\VWHP´SAE (2018) complement this definition with a 
taxonomy, E\RXWOLQLQJKRZDGULYHU¶Vresponsibility varies across the different levels of 
automation, and a distinction if they were system- or driver-initiated transitions. The need for 
such transitions of control is partly based on current system limitations, in terms of the 
WHFKQRORJ\¶Voperational design domain (see NHTSA, 2016, for a more descriptive definition of 
the problem), where vehicles cannot operate in all scenarios, and the human drivers are 
expected to supervise the automation and resume control, whenever a system limitation is 
reached. However, the inherent problem with such supervisory roles is diminished driving 
capabilities associated with the relinquishing of control, which his associated with several 
challenges when drivers are requested to resume control, especially in time-critical scenarios 
(Louw, 2017). Some of these issues are discussed below. 
2.1. The decision-action loop 
According to many authors (e.g. Young, 2012), manual driving is a task which requires 
the driver to always be in the information processing ³ORRS´ZLWKUHJDUGVWR their interactions with 
the surrounding road environment, as well as their ability to control and coordinate vehicle 
manoeuvres, involving steering, acceleration and braking. Thomas (2001) states that the 
operation of a vehicle is closely associated with constant feedback and feed-forward cycle of 
human interaction with the task. Here, humans¶ decisions and actions affect the situation, and 
this change is perceived once more by the individuals, who orient and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. Merat et al. (2018) further complement this logic for the context of vehicle 
automation (based on the model purposed by Michon, 1985), by stating that there are two 
distinct loops in manual driving, which can be affected by ceding control to automation: one for 
motor-control coordination, and another for the several decision-making processes that need to 
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be performed while driving. They suggest ³«WKDW³EHLQJLQWKHORRS´FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQ
WHUPVRIWKHGULYHU¶VSK\VLFDOFRQWURORIWKHYHKLFOHDQGPRQLWRULQJWKHFXUUHQWGULYLQJ
VLWXDWLRQ«´0HUDWHWDO,WPXVWEHQRWHGWKDWERWKORRSV continually interact with each 
other, and drivers must be aware of both their visual-motor coordination (see Wilkie et al., 2008 
for a more descriptive definition of the term) and the surrounding environment, to safely maintain 
control of the task. 
 
Figure 1 Representation of the decision-DFWLRQORRSDQGGULYHUV¶PRQLWRULQJUROHLQPDQXDOFRQWURORIWKH
GULYLQJWDVN0HUDWHWDOEDVHGRQ0LFKRQ¶VPRGHO&RS\ULJKW© 2019 Springer. Reprinted with 
Permission of Springer Publications). 
 
 
2.2. Situation Awareness Recovery 
Using driving simulator experiments, Louw et al. (2016), supplemented by previous 
evidence from Damböck et al. (2013), argue that by removing drivers from the decision-making 
and control loops, vehicle automation reduces GULYHUV¶6ituation Awareness (SA; Endsley, 1995), 
which needs to be re-acquired in order to safely resume control and avoid potentially dangerous 
situations on the road (Damböck et al., 2013). The definition of Situation Awareness used in this 
research, and defined initially by Endsley (1988), LV³the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
SURMHFWLRQRIWKHLUVWDWXVLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH´,QVKRUWSA can be divided into three levels 
(perception; comprehension and prediction), which allow humans to orient their decisions in a 
particular context and volume of time (Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2 Endsley's model of SA. This is a synthesis of versions she has given in several sources, notably 
Endsley (1995) and Endsley et al. (2000), in Wickens (2008). 
 
 
The loss of Situation AZDUHQHVVDQGLWVUHODWLRQWREHLQJ³RXWRIWKHORRS´KDYHEHHQ
declared by a number of studies on vehicle automation (Carsten et al., 2012; Ohn-Bar & Trivedi, 
2016; Morando et al., 2019), some of which have considered how these concepts are affected 
by GULYHUV¶HQJDJHPHQWin non-driving-related tasks. It is argued that upon a request to resume 
control from automation, drivers have to move their visual attention from the NDRT, to focus on 
other sources of information, related to the driving task, to acquire enough SA to take back 
control of the vehicle. Gartenberg et al. (2014) refer to this process (which is not only relevant to 
vehicle automation) as Situation Awareness Recovery or SAR. This is described as a visual 
scanning process with a considerable number of short fixations in different areas, with a 
significant lag of resumption in tasks, and a high probability of re-fixation to the same information 
source, more than once. Examples of such a process was observed in Louw et al. (2019), who 
reported in their driving simulator experiments that drivers who were engaged in a visual non-
driving-related task during automation (assumed to induce an OotL state) had a more scattered 
gaze pattern after resumption of control from a silent automation failure, compared to those who 
were required to monitor the road environment during automation. 
One of the challenges for the human factors community in addressing this problem is that 
the process of SAR is accompanied by several barriers, called SA challenges (Endsley, 2006). 
Endsley & Kriss (1995) named several challenges for the Situation Awareness acquisition, such 
as attention tunQHOOLQJFKDQJHEOLQGQHVVVWUHVVRQRSHUDWRUV¶GULYHUV¶ZRUNLQJPHPRU\DV
well as the division of the information required from multiple sources, making it difficult for 
operators to gather all the information they might need in a reasonable amount of time (e.g. see 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1998). For driving automation, it has been demonstrated that time 
pressure, or information overload, PLJKWDIIHFWWKHTXDOLW\RIGULYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH. This is 
thought to be because drivers¶ attentional resources are continuously stretched by the high 
demands of the driving task itself, which is aggravated by automation (Goodrich & Boer, 2003). 
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7KHGLVSHUVLRQRIGULYHUV¶JD]HDOVRFRPSHWHVEHWZHHQIRFXVHGDWWHQWLRQto WKHYHKLFOH¶V
heading (due to a visual-motor coordination, Wilkie et al., 2008) and hazard perception routines, 
which are generally characterised by an increased lateral gaze dispersion (Crundall et al., 1999). 
Therefore, drivers not only have to acquire information about the situation in the environment, 
and the current status of the system (an issue also reported by Endsley, 2006), but also have to 
recover their visual-motor coordination, which is degraded once you relinquish control from the 
vehicle (Mole et al., 2019).  Many empirical studies show that this need to disperse visual 
attention to different sources affects GULYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQFUHDVLQJULVNRIFUDVKHVVHH5XVVHO
et al., 2016; Zeeb et al., 2015; Blommer et al., 2016; Louw et al., 2017; Merat et al., 2014; Gold 
et al., 2013; Damböck et al., 2013). 
3. DECISION-MAKING THEORY PRINCIPLES AND MODELS  
The definition of decision-making adopted in this work was proposed by Edwards (1954), 
and is defined DVIROORZV³«JLYHQWZRVWDWHV$DQG%LQWRHLWKHURQHRIZKLFKDQLQGLYLGXDO
may put himselIWKHLQGLYLGXDOFKRRVHV$LQSUHIHUHQFHWR%RUYLFHYHUVD´7KLVGHILQLWLRQZDV
further developed by Simon (1959), who added organised this process into four main stages: 1) 
definition of the problem, 2) identification of possible solutions, 3) objective assessment of the 
value of each solution for the problem, 4) choice of the best solution. As human beings, we are 
continuously making decisions, based on our internal representation of what we should do in 
every situation, given certain parameters (stage 3). In a driving task, many actions involve a 
decision-making process. Some examples include deciding: a comfortable car-following distance 
(Boer, 1999), what gaps we will accept when changing lanes (Gipps, 1986), how we respond to 
a potential forward collision (Blommer et al., 2017), and whether to disengage from automation 
(see Markkula et al., 2018, for more examples). 
In the context of this paper, decision-PDNLQJFDQEHGHILQHGDVWKHGULYHUV¶FKRLFHWR
take-over control of the vehicle or not, and their take-over modality (how do they take-over). 
When constructing a model for such decision-making, to account for a good or bad decision, in 
terms of safety, we have as observable output variables  the decision-making time (how long 
drivers took to decide to take-over), decision choice (how they reacted to the given scenario) 
and outcome (based on the objectives established for the given situation, were they able to 
achieve this goal?). Yet, there are several kinds of decision-making theory models, which may 
account for different aspects of human behaviour, and might be useful for certain situations and 
not others. Edwards (1954) also divided the decision-making theory models in two main 
spectrums, which their most recent and developed definitions shall be further explained in the 
later sections of this paper: the rational and risky decision-making models. 
3.1. Rational decision-making models 
The concept of rational decision-making (see Simon (1979) and March (1978) for a more 
descriptive definition of the term) is based on a metaphorical ³WKLQNLQJPDQ´DVDGHFLVLRQ-
maker. According to Simon (1979) and March (1978), a thinking man can be characterized as an 
individual by two main conditions: 1) as being capable of acquiring and distinguishing all 
possible relevant information for the decision in hand; and 2) the thinking man is capable of 
assigning the correct value of a specific choice, based on their established goal in each 
decision-making scenario. Based on these assumptions, two individuals would always arrive at 
the same conclusion, when making a rational decision about the same problem. The only 
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difference between their choices would be personal bias, or what outcome they want from the 
decision. 
Good examples of rational decision-making models can be seen in game theory (Nash, 
1950), which posits that all choices made by an individual have a counterpart by a ³hostile´ 
opponent (like a chess game). The opponent will focus their actions on maximising their chances 
RIDFKLHYLQJWKHLUJRDOZKLFKLVWKHRSSRVLWHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VJRDO$QRWKHUH[DPSOHRID
rational decision can be seen in the utilitarianism theory, created by Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill in the early 19th century. This theory holds that there are ³greater goods´ in life, and 
every moral DFWLRQFDQEHTXDQWLILHGLQWHUPVWKHRXWFRPHRI³KDSSLQHVV´and that it is always 
right to maximise happiness in our choices in life for a ³greater good´ (for a more complete 
description of the term, see Mill, 1868). Indeed, rational decision-making processes are utopic in 
most cases, and their scope for applicability is limited, as everything needs to be quantifiable, 
such as in mathematical logic problem solutions (for examples, see Bell et al., 1988). 
3.2. Risky decision-making models 
According to decision-making theory, whenever the decision-maker is forced to make a 
decision without a clear notion of the possible outcomes of their choice, this process is 
considered to be a risky decision (Edwards, 1954). Models in the risky decision-making theory 
are based on the assumptions: 1) that not all variables can be accurately, or even wholly, 
quantified, 2) that humans are not certain about how their actions will affect the environment of 
the task in hand, and, 3) humans are not aware of are all the variables that they should consider 
to make their decision. Humans in that situation can estimate, based on their mental models 
(see Nielsen, 2010 for a description of the term), the probable outcomes for a given task for 
each possible action that they can perform, and use that information to guide their decision-
making. In situations where the outcome of an LQGLYLGXDO¶Vdecision is not predictable, they need 
to account for a level of uncertainty as part of their decision-making process. Uncertainty is 
defined by Shaw (1983) as the inability of the decision-making to assign the correct value of an 
option, nor predict the outcomes of their decision to the given environment. This uncertainty 
concept is a key assumption underlying risky decision-making models and is discussed later in 
WKLVSDSHU$VKXPDQV¶PHQWDOSURFHVVLQJLVQRWGLUHFWO\REVHUYDEOHULVN\GHFLVLRQ-making 
models can be used to explain human behaviour based on certain assumptions. The most 
relevant ones are described below: 
 
Evidence accumulation models assume that every decision-maker a priori does not 
have sufficient information about the situation to make a decision and will seek evidence that will 
influence their decision towards one of the outcomes known to them. Furthermore, every 
individual has a personal threshold of accumulated evidence that, once reached, causes them to 
opt for one possible choice, over another (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This threshold varied based 
on a number of factors, including experience, gender, personal attitudes and many others. It 
must be noted that the rate of evidenceRU³GULIW´ is accumulated differently for every person, 
which is also influenced by a number of factors. In the field of vehicle automation, Markkula et al. 
(2018) have demonstrated how to apply decision-making models based on evidence-
accumulation to explain, for example, what information drivers use to decide how to resume 
control from vehicle automation to avoid an incoming forward collision. 
Bounded rationality models, first defined by Simon (1972), which holds that humans 
can make decisions based on the information available to them. These have similar assumptions 
to rational decision-making models but differ in that they assume that humans are not capable of 
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considering all the relevant information to make a decision. This can be caused by a lack of 
cognitive resources, time pressure, or simple lack of knowledge about the presence of a 
particular source of information. Considering this paradigm, bounded rationality models assume 
that the decision-maker prioritises certain information over others (randomly or selectively). This 
prioritised information will most likely bias the decision towards a particular choice, depending on 
the information sampled, and not only on individual preferences. This kind of model is especially 
relevant for the transition of control in vehicle automation, as it is assumed that drivers in such 
situations can be overloaded with large volumes of spatially dispersed visual information, and 
may not be able to process all the information they would need Examples for such overload can 
be found in Gold et al. (2013) and Blommer et al. (2017), who show that drivers change their 
decisions about when to resume control from automation, based on the amount of time they 
have to react before the automated system reaches its limit. Although, it is worth considering 
that those authors haveonly considered visual information, so other factors might also have 
affected the observed results. 
 
Satisficing decision-making models assume that the decision-maker will not seek the 
most optimal solution for his/her problem, but instead will make the first decision where the 
outcome satisfies their needs or goals in the given situation (Wierzbicki, 1982; Parke et al., 
2007). This approach was used in studies by Boer (1999), Boer & Hoedemaeker (1998), and 
Goodrich & Boer (2003), in different scenarios. For example, Boer (1999) demonstrated that 
GULYHUVWHQGWRKDYHQRWRQHVSHFLILF³LGHDOcar-following dLVWDQFH´EXWUDWKHUKDYHD satisficing 
margin, that floats closer or further to the lead vehicle, where the drivers assume to be safe and 
close enough to be satisfied and refocus in other demands from the car-following task (such as 
lateral control of the vehicle), instead of actively re-adjust their following distance to a point they 
would consider to be ideal.  
 Most concepts in these models are somewhat interchangeable and can be combined in 
a descriptive or mechanistic analysis. Their relationship with the field of automation will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections of this work. 
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN FACTORS CHALLENGES AND RISKY 
DECISION-MAKING 
Based on the two types of decision-making theory models described above, it is evident 
that the process of Situation Awareness recovery during the transition control from vehicle 
automation presents several similarities to the risky decision-making theory, which is discussed 
in the following sections. Merat et al. (2018) stated that drivers re-enter the cognitive loop of the 
driving task by acquiring sufficient levels of Situation Awareness. In the same way, Ratcliff & 
Smith (2004) claim that whenever an individual is presented with an opportunity to make a 
decision, they will need to accumulate evidence that will support the choice they eventually 
make. This direct comparison shows similarities in the applicability of both the concept of 
evidence accumulation and SA for those theories with the same purpose, which is to understand 
how humans use the information to react to a given environmental condition and achieve their 
desired goal.  Fig. 2 presents a schematic representation of the proposed relationship between 
the two theories. 
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Figure 3 Representation of the relationship between SA and decision-making theory 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, decision-making theory holds that the decision- making process is 
composed by four steps: 1) define the problem, and understand its characteristics; 2) 
formulate/generate possible solutions for the given problem; 3) estimation of the value of 
possible outcomes; 4) selection of the outcome with the highest value for the given problem (see 
Simon, 1959 for a better description). Endsley (1995) divided the SA into levels, in a way that 
the individual needs to 1) identify the elements in the environment, 2) comprehend their 
meaning, and how it shapes the situation in hand, and 3) orient how those elements can be 
interacted with, in a way that is possible to predict what can be the outcomes of their potential 
actions. According to Simon (1957) and Edwards (1954), a decision can only be made if there is 
a clear notion/definition of the value of each solution to the upcoming problem, and that to 
achieve this, the decision-maker accumulates evidence that assigns the correct value to a 
particular option, reducing the decision-PDNHU¶VOHYHORIXQFHUWDLQW\6KDZ2EVHUYLQJWKH
same phenomenon through the lenses of the SA theory, we can understand that the 
comprehension of the problem (in the case of this work, a request to transition control) and their 
possible solutions as level two SA. The process of assigning value, or expected outcome of 
possible action in order to make the appropriate decision can be directly linked to the level three 
situation awareness, or projection of future states. In this framework, it can be assumed that the 
process of moving from level two to level three SA can be directly compared to the process of 
accumulation of evidence, which is simply the reduction of uncertainty about the outcomes of a 
possible action to a given scenario. 
The arguments presented in the previous section showed that barriers, called SA 
challenges (Endsley, 2006), impede DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ to acquire all the sufficient levels of SA 
they need to make an optimal resumption of control from automation (see Parasuraman & Riley 
(1997) for an example of such phenomenon). Analysing the challenges imposed to an individual 
to resume control from automation through the lens of decision-making theory, similar problem is 
reported by Edwards (1954) and Simon (1957) who say that an entirely rational decision is 
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utopic. The authors believe that barriers imposed by the scenario, such as time pressure and a 
bounded rationality, forces the human decision-maker to deal with uncertainty, by making 
assumptions about certain conditions about the environment, based on their expectations, and, 
thus, adopting a risky decision. As examples relating to resumption of control from vehicle 
automation, Blommer et al. (2017) and Gold et al. (2013) showed that drivers have an increased 
SUREDELOLW\WR³MXVWEUDNH´LQVWHDGRIERWKEUDNLQJDQGVWHHULQJZKHQHYHUWKH\KDGOLPLWHGWLPH
to respond to the scenario. The authors noted WKDWWKHVFHQDULRH[FHHGHGGULYHUV¶DELOLWLHVWR
cope with the situation and to perform the ideal action. These two examples can be translated in 
the risky decision-making theory as satisficing decision-making actions, where even if it was not 
perfect, it was the best they could do with the information they had, opting to make a simple 
reaction to the scenario. 
Based on the arguments presented above, we believe that risky decision-making theory 
is a suitable candidate to model the process of the take-over of control from vehicle automation. 
The application of decision-making theory can complement the existing studies on the transition, 
as it can be used to understand the relationship between the information sampled by drivers and 
their subsequent behaviour. Practically speaking, this approach complements the current 
studies in the field by providing robust mathematical models that assign causality between 
evidence accumulation and decision (see Orquin & Loose, 2013), which are not commonly 
linked to the situation awareness theory. It is now essential to evaluate how this theory can be 
applied and implemented to better describe driver behaviour during transitions of control.  
5. USING DECISION-MAKING MODELS 7225,(17'5,9(56¶DECISION-
MAKING 
Sivak (1996) stated that vision is the most important of the five human senses for driving, 
but yet, it is not suited to dealing with multiple demands at the same time. For this reason, 
drivers need to prioritise certain visual information over others to perform a transition of control 
(for more details about this process, see Goodrich & Boer, 2003).   
According to Orquin & Loose (2013), visual attention and decision-making are tightly 
coupled, since a GULYHU¶V risky decision-making is continuously biased by whether or not they 
attended to relevant visual information available to them. In their literature review, the authors 
found a co-causal relationship between visual attendance to information and the occurrence of 
specific choices, in a discrete decision-making scenario. As part of a meta-analysis, the authors 
analysed several decision-making tasks that used eye-tracking data as a dependent variable. 
They concluded that an LQGLYLGXDO¶VJD]H fixation on certain essential information could predict 
their upcoming choice in a discrete scenario, suggesting that the selective attention of drivers 
may bias their decision-PDNLQJ6XFKDQDSSURDFKPD\DOVREHDSSOLHGWRDQDO\VHGULYHUV¶
response capabilities in a take-over scenario, once a take-over reaction is nothing more than a 
selective response to a particular scenario condition.  
The arguments above support the possibility of modelling the relationship between 
different gaze allocation strategies and the probability of yielding specific responses to the take-
over control scenario (based on the studies reported by Orquin & Loose, 2013). This approach 
would inform system designers about which information should be scanned with higher priority, 
to yield a higher probability of safe and timely responses to different take-over scenarios. This 
information could be used to create HMIs that guide drivers towards making decisions that result 
in safe outcomes. For example, indicating where drivers should focus their attention for a 
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successful transition of control could help avoid an impending collision, as suggested by Louw et 
al. (2017). 
6. CONCLUSION 
The primary aim of this paper was to assess the feasibility of applying risky decision-
making theory models to understand GULYHUV¶WDNH-over behaviour during transitions of control 
from vehicle automation. A secondary aim was to explain how decision-making models could be 
implemented by system designers as a tool to understand human behaviour and create products 
that better suit driver needs. 
The initial sections point out similarities between the theories on SA and risky decision-
making, which makes them comparable and applicable for similar purposes. The main points of 
proximity between the two theories include the concepts of evidence accumulation and level 
three situation awareness, respectively, to account for how humans make a decision in a given 
scenario. We also proposed that models that correlate vision and decision-making modality as a 
causal factor could be used to identify which information, once sampled, can increase the 
SUREDELOLW\IRUGULYHUVWRSHUIRUPDVXSSRVHG³RSWLPDOUHVSRQVH´In conclusion, we propose that 
decision-making models, based on evidence accumulation, can be used in HMI design, to 
HQKDQFHGULYHUV¶acquisition of certain essential information and, thereby, optimise their take-
over performance. For example, if we know how drivers sample visual information before an 
optimal response, and we use this knowledge to design HMIs to reproduce this behaviour in 
other drivers in similar situations, then we may increase the probability that they respond 
similarly. 
As for limitations and future directions, this work is chiefly a theoretical consideration and 
lacks sufficient evidence to defend the real value of the application of decision-making models in 
the design process for human-centric vehicle automation systems. Empirical studies are 
required to evaluate how well decision-PDNLQJPRGHOVFDQSUHGLFWGULYHUV¶WDNH-over modality, 
and whether, if certain infRUPDWLRQLVKLJKOLJKWHGLQWKHV\VWHPGHVLJQGULYHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQ
take-over scenarios can be enhanced. 
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